Capability-based Authentication and Access Control in Internet of Things by Mishra, Bighnaraj
Capability-based
Authentication and Access Control
in Internet of Things
Bighnaraj Mishra
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Odisha, India
Capability-based
Authentication and Access Control
in Internet of Things
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Technology
in
Computer Science and Engineering
(Specialization - Information Security)
by
Bighnaraj Mishra
(Roll: 213CS2164)
under the supervision of
Prof. Ashok Kumar Turuk
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Odisha, India
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Odisha, India.
May 20, 2015
Certificate
This is to certify that the work in the thesis entitled Capability-based
Authentication and Access Control in Internet of Things by Bighnaraj
Mishra, bearing roll number 213CS2164, is a record of an original research work
carried out by him under my supervision and guidance in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Technology in Computer
Science and Engineering (Specialization - Information Security). Neither this thesis
nor any part of it has been submitted for any degree or academic award elsewhere.
Ashok Kumar Turuk
Professor
Acknowledgment
I take this opportunity to thank all those who have contributed in this journey.
Foremost, I would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Ashok
Kumar Turuk for providing motivation, enthusiasm, and critical atmosphere at the
workplace. His profound insights and attention to details have been true inspirations
to my research. He has taught me to handle difficult situations with confidence and
courage.
I thank all the professors of the department of Computer Science Engineering for the
resources and environment they have provided for the successful completion of my work.
The thesis would not have been successful without their support. Besides, I thank my
friends and peers who have been a source of inspiration for the work.
I would like to thank my friends and seniors at NIT Rourkela for the help they have
offered during the entire period of my stay.
I must acknowledge the academic resources that I got from National Institute of
Technology Rourkela. I would like to thank the administrative and technical staff
members of the Department who have been kind enough to advise and help in their
respective roles.
Finally, I owe the heartfelt thanks to my parents and family members for their
unconditional love, support, and patience, which has been a guiding force for the work
I have done.
Bighnaraj Mishra
Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) foresees the interaction and communication between
different physical entities, which are constrained devices in this physical world.
The entities also communicate with the Internet to provide solution for different
complex problems. It goes for empowering future advances and dreams like, smart
apartment, building automation, intelligent city construction, and e-health service.
Secure data transmission is of prime importance in these scenarios. Standard
IP-based security arrangements don’t address this issue as they are not composed in
view of the restrictions of obliged gadgets. Consequently, more lightweight security
components are required. The entities in the domain of IoT come from different
vendors. Authentication and Authorization of these entities in a network demands
the exchange of identity, certificates and protocol suites. High computation power
and memory is required for this transmission. We propose a framework in which
the authentication, authorization and key distribution is delegated. It also integrates
capability-based fine-grained access control of services. Our evaluation implements
different cryptographic algorithms to manage authentication and authorization of the
entities in the domain of IoT using this framework. The simulation measures the time
unit taken for managing these security aspects. The framework is also tested in a
hardware-based testbed and justifies that this framework might be used in most of the
IoT domain.
Keywords: IoT, entity, Cryptography, AAKDS, access token, DTLS, certificate, COOJA,
Arduino, ESP8266.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT),coined by Kevin Ashton [1], infers a future world where
both living and non-living physical entities are Internet connected and be able to
communicate amongst themselves and with the web service applications. The entities
attached with the micro-controllers and sensors represent hosts in the web. Henceforth,
permitting the constrained entities of this real world to end up top notch nationals
of the Internet. The IoT makes a framework that encourages the acknowledgment
of future advancements and visions [2], for example, (i) smart homes, where most
of the things can be controlled remotely, e.g. aerating and cooling, doors, windows,
entryways and apparatuses; (ii) Smart urban areas, which take into consideration a
more proficient administration of the city, e.g. administration of road lights, element
lighting taking into account current movement stream, identifying and observing of
locations of contamination/commotion/temperature of the places; (iii) Smart electricity
supply system and smart meter, which in light of the customers’ conduct would enhance
the productivity and manageability of the generation and dissemination of power; (iv)
Smart Health, where health checkup equipments are interconnected to give the medical
facilities at home.
Physical entities, connected with constrained devices are commonly implanted
frameworks and asset obliged as to power, calculation, and memory. Such obliged
gadgets are connected and access the services from the Internet, which is untrusted.
This requires some sort of security features. The recent security solutions like TLS [3]
and IPsec [4] are IP-based, but since the communication cost is very high and they
need lavish processing for handshaking, they are not intended for constrained devices.
Henceforth, existing IP-based security standards can’t be utilized effectively directly.
This demands the interest of security solutions that can be applied reliably to
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the constrained devices. Security solutions ought to be standard agreeable with a
specific final goal to empower the acknowledgment of the IoT vision and to encourage
interoperability. In the present scenario, symmetric key based security protocols like
Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) can be used to provide host to host security services in WSNs.
PSK is prominent in WSN because of it’s low resource requirements for computation
and verification. This methodology is adequate for segregated and neighborhood
situations, where a domain administrator deals with the key dispersion. In any case,
the key administration in symmetric key-based arrangements are unreasonable and not
adaptable, particularly when the entities are from distinct domains as in case of IoT.
The reason behind this is that a single key that is used by every host needs to be
preoccupied and this key has to be predeployed.
One of the commanding security solution on the Internet to provide end to end
(E2E) security is the Public Key Cryptography (PKC). It settles the key administration
problems and permits message verification without a preshared key on each end.
Besides, the certificate based approach used in PKC, provides extra administrations
to improve the vision of IoT, where symmetric key-based solutions miss the mark.
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [5] is an IP-based security convention
that accompanies adaptability in the cryptographic configuration that takes into
consideration both PSK and PKC-based verification. So an interesting issue is to
measure the overheads of both plans and present a thorough comparison.
1.1 Motivation
With the large use of internet and automated devices, the demand of application
of IOT increases day by day. Initially RFID was considered as the only method
of communication, although it also may include other sensor technologies, wireless
technologies or QR codes. Now IP-based protocols and technologies are integrated
with the availability of the advantages of IPV6.
The service providing entity is not only accessed by the owner, but is now connected
to surrounding entities and databases. Many objects act in unison, to provide ambient
intelligence. Also, they can be accessed and controlled remotely by legitimate servers
other than the owner.
Considering this scenario, proper authentication and access control techniques need
to be applied so that only ethic users can access and communicate with the entities.
2
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1.2 Objectives
In this thesis, we look for an efficient standards-based security framework for IoT. The
key objectives of this thesis are:
• The review of the different authentication schemes used by constrained networks;
• Design of a capability-based authentication and authorization framework for IOT
to overcome the overheads of mutual certificate sharing authentication scheme;
• The framework facilitates the security services;
• The authorization should be fine-grained;
• The computation power constraint and memory availability constraint are taken
care of.
1.3 Thesis Organization
We divide our work as follows. Chapter 2 explores about constrained entities,
cryptographic requirements and DTLS protocol suite. Chapter 3 formulates the
problem statement and propose a delegation-based framework to enable security
services for constrained devices in IoT. In Chapter 4 we implement and evaluate the
framework using COOJA simulator [6] and analyze the time unit taken for different
events of our framework. Chapter 5 analyzes the memory space requirement of our
framework, through hardware emulation, using Arduino micro-controller. Finally, we
conclude this thesis in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Security Aspects in IoT
The essential literature survey for this thesis is presented here. In the first section, we
talk about the characteristics of the constrained devices and the network in which
they function. Then, a brief overview on relevant cryptographic requirements are
highlighted. We talk about the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol
at last.
2.1 Constrained Entities and the Network
Environment
Constrained devices are furnished with restricted memory, CPU and power facility.
The network environment consisting of these devices makes the physical world smart
through sensors, communication and activating usefulness into intense devices. In this
section, we quickly talk about the qualities of such compelled substances concerning
IOT and the systems they work in.
The constrained entities are attached with Micro-Controller Units (MCU),or
tiny sensors and motors to be used as standalone devices. They come with low
computation-power CPUs, and small size of storage for code and information. Besides,
low power consumption becomes essential since most of them may be battery-controlled.
Such constrained devices mostly impart remote, while outskirt switches and Gateways
(GWs) that associate one network like Internet with a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
, may have wired connection [7]. IEEE 802.15.4 [8] standard is a mostly used data link
layer technology for WSNs.
Some other low-power technologies like Low-Power IEEE 802.11 [9] and Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) [10], are already in function. Be that as it may, these innovations
4
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are at present being created and are not yet generally conveyed in WSNs.
Preamble SFD Length Link Layer Frame Payload
Frame Control Sequence Number Addressing Field Security Header Data Payload FCS
4 bytes 1 byte 1 byte 0-127 bytes
2 bytes 2 bytes1 byte 0-20 bytes 0-20 bytes
Figure 2.1: Frame Structure in IEEE 802.15.4.
Constrained devices commonly work in low-control IP systems, which are because
of the confined way of such implanted gadgets with restricted memory, power and
computational facility. The rare resources leads to smaller packet queueing conceivable
outcomes in a compelled hub, which part of the way begins the lossy way of Low power
and Lossy Networks (LLNs). The frame arrangement in the MAC and physical layers
in IEEE 802.15.4 is shwon in Figure 2.1.
2.2 IP Connectivity
Internet of Things (IoT) has a vision of conveying the network for things sake to the
Internet. Constrained entities become empowered through this integration prerequisite.
Moreover, because of the far reaching ability of IP network, IP-empowered systems
are more proficient with respect to upgrade. The utilization of a typical convention
stack, for example, IP, takes into account interoperability of heterogeneous devices
from distinctive producers. At that point, all devices utilize a very much standardized
protocol suite. Besides, a standard protocol suite makes the devices independent of
link layer.
Constrained systems are getting to be IP-empowered systems and subsequently
moving far from segregated WSNs towards interoperable and web-enabled systems.
For this an IP supporting layer is needed which helps in modifying IP packets for
the routing of the packets in constrained network, for example, IEEE 802.15.4-based
systems. IPv6 over Lowpower Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) [11, 12]
is such a layer for IEEE 802.15.4-based systems. It resides between the Network layer
and the Data Link Layer. For this thesis 6LoWPAN is pertinent, since its usefulness
influences the integration and henceforth the secure communication.
5
2.3 Requirement of Cryptography Security Aspects in IoT
2.3 Requirement of Cryptography
Cryptography is basic to give security in an IOT feel. Hence, a brief diagram
about security objectives and real dangers in system security are examined here.
Subsequently, the idea and application of symmetric cryptography is visualized. We
cover Public Key Cryptography (PKC) and structure of X.509 certificates [13] towards
the end.
2.3.1 Security and Threats
Cryptographic primitives are used to provide the prime security goals for exchanging
messages and to protect the network itself. These goals are: (i) integrity, the original
message remains intact, (ii) confidentiality, only the authorized entities can access
the data, (iii) authenticity, the entity genuineness is verified, and (iv) availability, the
system provides service continuously to the legitimate entities.
Assault methods are critical to comprehend the reason of security components in
communication protocols [14]. The accompanying attacks are essential concern to
secure Internet of Things (IoT), : (i) Eavesdropping is the procedure of unauthentic
accessing of data stream during a communication. (ii) Impersonation is the point
at which a malevolent substance puts on a show to be as an authentic element (iii)
The MITM (Man In The Middle) attack happens when a noxious element intrudes on
the correspondence of two genuine elements and is equipped for deferring, altering or
dropping messages. (iv) The DoS attack focuses on the accessibility of a framework
that offers administrations. This is attained to by thoroughly getting to assets at the
casualty so that the offered administrations get to be distracted to genuine elements.
For constrained devices where existing assets are as of now rare, this is very critical.
2.3.2 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography
In Symmetric cryptography both the end-points share a single key. The encryption
and decryption operations of the cryptographic algorithms are performed using this
secret key. The Symmetric-key cryptography algorithms are broadly divided into
two categories: block ciphers and stream ciphers. Because of the use of the
constrained entities in the environment of IOT, light-weight cryptographic algorithms
are generally used. Some of the prominent light-weight cryptographic algorithms are
AES, PRESENT, HUMMINGBIRD, etc.
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One major problem in the symmetric cryptography is the the single key has to
be shared between the endpoints. Use of a central key distribution point can solve
this issue. But a secure E2E connection has to be established between the entities
and the key distribution center. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) or Asymmetric
cryptography is the alternate way of achieving security goals. It uses two different
keys for encryption and decryption. The keys are derived based on hard problems that
require a lot of computational power to solve like: prime factorization problem, discrete
logarithm problem and a high numeric power calculation problem. The prominently
used public-key cryptosystems are RSA, ECC, ECDSA, ECDH, etc.
2.3.3 X.509 Certificates
X.509 certificates are standard certificates prominently used to provide authentication.
The structure of X.509 certificates is discussed here.
• Version number : defines the version of X.509.
• Serial Number : defines a number assigned to each certificate.
• Signature algorithm ID : defines the algorithm used to sign the certificate.
• Issuer name: defines the certification authority that issued the certificate.
• Validity period : defines the earliest time and the latest time the certificate is
valid.
• Subject name: defines the entity to which the public key belongs.
• Subject public key : defines the owners public key.
• Issuer unique identifier (optional): using unique value here, the two issuer can
have a same Issuer name field.
• Subject unique identifier (optional): using unique value here, the two issuer can
have a same Subject name field.
• Extensions (optional): more private information can be added to the certificate
using this.
• Signature: used for authentication of the certificate.
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2.3.4 Implicit Certificate
Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV) needs less
public-key-based operations [15]. It’s size is small too. So it is more efficient and
suitable for constrained network as compared to traditional X.509 certificates.
A X.509 certificate is made out of the three fundamental components: Public Key
PKX of entity X, data DATAX of that entity, and the signature SIGNCA of the past
two components marked by a CA. Conversely, an implicit certificate just conveys the
data component DATAX. This helps in reduce the certificate size, which is very short
like the measure of the utilized elliptic curve public key, for occurrence 256 bit. The
public key PKX and SIGNCA are superimposed to DATAX. The public key PKX is
recreated from DATAX given public key of the CA. Moreover, it is expected that the
utilized elliptic curve is known to all parties. In ECQV, the coupling of the public key
to the proprietor is exhibited by demonstrating ownership of the private key relating
to the recreated public key. This certainly tying requires further message trades and
the utilization of the private key.
2.4 IP-based Security Protocol and DTLS
(TLS) [3] is a noticeable IP-based security convention broadly utilized as a part
of the Internet. It makes a straightforward association arranged secured channel
that avoids security attacks, for example, altering the message, eavesdropping, or
message imitation. The broadly utilized web protocol HTTP uses TLS protocol as
the security convention. The reliable Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) underlies
this HTTP during communication. Because of the small overhead and simple
structure, UDP is prominently used in the IP-empowered constrained networks, for
the on-interest communication example of such systems. Because of all these reasons,
the standardization community like Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) prefers
to use the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [5] as the important transport
layer security protocol.
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol structure consists of the
initial flights between the two entities to authenticate each other and key agreement.
Then the data is transmitted as the secure channel is established. The detail structure
of DTLS is shown below.
It consists of 8 flights as shown in Figure 2.2:
• Flight1 : Client sends a hello message and waits for the acknowledgment.
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HELLO
HELLO VERIFIED
REQUEST FOR CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
REQUEST FOR CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Figure 2.2: DTLS handshaking between Client and Server.
• Flight2 : Server sends the acknowledgment.
• Flight3 : Client requests for the certificate and cipher suite from Server.
• Flight4 : Server sends its cipher suite and certificates.
• Flight5 : Client sends an acknowledgment after receiving.
• Flight6 : Server sends a request for the client certificates and cipher suite.
• Flight7 : Client sends its cipher suit and certificates.
• Flight8 : Server sends the acknowledgment.
2.5 COOJA Simulator and Contiki OS
Contiki [16] is a widely used open-source Operating System (OS) in micro controllers.
Contiki is suitable for the Internet of Things (IoT) network because it implements
with IP the full IPv6 protocol suite. It comes with hardware-specific drivers loadable
modules, which make it highly portable.
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Commonly, Contiki processes keep running in the agreeable setting. In any case, it
use preemptive setting to keep running interrupts and real-time timers. In addition, it
has a multi-threading library with optional preempting. It has drivers which facilitate
hardware access. So hardware-specific drivers are essential. The idea of drivers takes
into consideration an encapsulated hardware access through drivers. For instance, the
counters and clocks present in the hardware are used by the the current timer library
in Contiki , which supplies different clock functinalities and diverse scaled clocks.
Contiki is highly portable and it has small code size, since it is written in C.
Moreover, Contiki comprises of modules that can be improved by requirements. This
helps in designing a modified OS by using the flexible modules already present. For
example the TCP and UDP protocol suites can be altered depending upon the need of
the application development. The simulation tool named Cooja is another highlight of
Contiki OS, which helps in the procedure of development and debugging [6].
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Authorization and Access Control
in IoT
We have thoroughly made a survey on the security aspects of IoT in the last chapter .
We identified 4 major research directions for secure communication in the Internet of
Things (IoT). They are: (i) protocol-based extensions and optimizations, (ii) centralized
approaches, (iii) solutions that require special purpose hardware modules and (iv)
alternative delegation architectures. In this thesis, we concentrate on the delegation
architecture used for Authentication and Access Control.
3.1 Centralized approach and it’s Disadvantages
Secure M2M communication methodologies using symmetric-key are efficient and
suitable for constrained networks. On the other hand, a typical issue therefore is
the versatility of the key administration. Two entities must share a single key for
communication. So an entity must be preoccupied with all the keys with whom it
wants to communicate, before the actual deployment. To handle this issue scalable
and advanced key distribution techniques are introduced. Here, a key distributor is
used which is nothing but a central server which performs the task of key agreement.
The constrained entities are preoccupied with a secret key for safe communication
with the central server. This is applicable to small domains and it requires high
trust on the key distributor. However, establishing trust between key distributors of
distinct domains is challenging, when two entities present in two different domains
want to communicate. This requires additional non trivial infrastructure between
key distributors, like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). A centralized approach for
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securing unicast and multicast communication in constrained networks is presented
by Perrig et. al. called SPINS [17]. It is composed of two security protocols: the
Micro Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) and the Secure
Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP). TESLA provides authenticated broadcast for
constrained environments where as SNEP provides integrity and data confidentiality of
unicast communication. In the bootstrapping phase, each constrained device acquires
a master secret from the domain manager which could be the Gateway (GW) or sink
node in a WSN scenario. A Pseudorandom Function (PRF) is used between entities to
derive the Encryption and MAC keys from this master secret.
A polynomial-based scheme is proposed by Garcia-Morchon et. al. [18] to provide
trusted M2M communication in IoT which is an alternative to public-key-based
primitives in DTLS. The key distribution process in sensor networks is simplified here.
Here every entity E is assigned with a polynomial share P(E; b) derived from a secret
symmetric polynomial P(a; b). So only the nodes having a polynomial share, can have
a secret key P(E1; E2) used for communication.
3.2 Delegation-based Architectures
Delegation-based methodologies acquaint solutions to delegate computationally
escalated tasks to more powerful devices. For example, public-key-based operations
used in session setup is generally delegated. Server-based Certificate Validation
Protocol (SCVP) [19] is one of such delegation methods. Here a trusted server receives
the delegation of complex task of certificate path construction or certificate validation.
Clients needn’t bother with the particular usage for authentication acceptance and
could thus have a disentangled rationale. This, on the other hand, needs that the
SCVP server ought to be trusted very much like a neighborhood programming.
If there should be an occurrence of untrusted SCVP servers, the customer can
appoint less basic errands, for example, getting disavowal data by method for CRLs.
A MAC or a digital signature is used by SCVP to protect the integrity of the inquiries
and responses. A key agreement approach like Diffie-Hellman (DH) is used to infer
the key used to make the MAC. Thus, this implies that clients have to bolster
and perform extravagant public-key-based operations. Additionally, this methodology
further builds overhead inside constrained networks for the handshaking operations.
Because the handshake communication needs to transmit chain of certificates, which
causes most noteworthy transmission overhead since the length of certificates is very
12
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large. Moreover, extra protocol functionality related to SCVP is requierd for the
constrained devices.
Bonetto et. al. [20] introduce another delegation approach concern to IoT.
According to the proposal, the public-key-based operations are delegated to an all
the more efficient device like the Gateway (GW). They proposed the strategy, where
the GW professes to be the end point and intercepts the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
session establishment process. The constrained devices are handed over the session key
after computation of the same by the GW. Starting here on, this session key is used
by the entities to secure the communication.
The GW is considered as highly trusted in this technique. At this point, the
GW possessing the session key, as an on-way element, can access the plain text in
communication. Thus, it has the unnoticed capability of altering messages. This
breaks the node to node security, which may be satisfactory in case of some application.
For case, in mechanical industries the GW is profoundly trusted and this scheme can
be appreciably used. A Body Area Network (BAN) is another application scenario
where high trust level is given to the individual cell phone serves as the GW for highly
constrained devices. In any case, always a trusted GW is generally not available in
IoT vision. Case in point, in the smart urban area scenario, the network contains
constrained devices of distinctive makers. These devices don’t essentially impart a
solid trust connection to the GW which could be from an alternate administration
supplier.
3.3 IoT Scenario and Challenges
This segment portrays our objective system environment and clarifies the difficulties
in empowering End-to-End (E2E) security for the Internet of Things (IoT). In the
wake of contemplating the related work and getting to be acquainted with current
methodologies, we can now call attention to their shortcomings and deficiencies in
empowering productive secure E2E correspondence. Afterwords we figure out the
objective of this thesis.
3.3.1 IoT Network
IoT network comprises of heterogeneous entities in the scope of profoundly compelled
devices to capable devices, for example, the Cloud, where the backend administration
can dwell. An obliged system is interconnected through a Gateway (GW) with
13
3.3 IoT Scenario and Challenges Authorization and Access Control in IoT
unconstrained systems, for example, the Internet.
Numerous network characteristics, for example, idleness and strength of the routing,
are critically affected by the network topology of a constrained network environment.
The nodes can shape a single-hop network like in the associated star topology, or
structure a multi-hop network depending upon the distinctive conceivable network
breadths. Notwithstanding, the network topology is extremely application-driven.
Case in point, since passages and streets are a major aspect of the smart urban [21]
the line topology is important and for sensor deployments [22] the tree topology is
commonly used. Figure 3.1 shows the two noteworthy communication designs we find
in our objective network scenario. First is the inter-domain communication between
a constraint entity and a host in the Internet through a GW that empowers the
inter-connectivity of two domains. The other one is the local communication inside
the space of a constrained network.
Internet
E1
E2
Figure 3.1: A network with constrained entities(Ei) connected with a Remote Sever(R)
through a gateway GW.
3.3.2 Challenges for Secure IoT
Enabling a safe Internet of Things (IoT) needs adapting to technical and specialized
scenarios [23]. In the accompanying, we quickly talk about some of the challenges needs
to be considered.
• Tight resource-constraints : The most essential difficulties that ought to be
addressed in any security arrangement regarding IoT is the little availability
of the resources of constrained devices, for example, memory, CPU, data
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transfer capacity and power. The small size of memory may not give sufficient
space for holding data and code to implement different security approaches.
The constrained CPU needs extra time for expensive encryption, decryption
and certificate validation process operations. This eventually influences the
responsiveness of the entity, since amid these operations the entity cannot tail
its actual function. Also, this specifically influences the life time and the energy
utilization of the entity.
• Heterogeneous resources : The existence of the heterogeneous devices is one of
the unavoidable characteristics concerned to IoT. The distinctive categories of
entities and the heterogeneity has to be taken care of while making the security
arrangements for the extensive variety of device sorts.
• Bootstrapping : The life cycle of a constrained entity begins with the deployment
and the first run through bootstrapping. Afterwords, a long haul operational
mode takes after where the application is running and performing predefined
undertakings. Amid a long lifetime, incidental upkeep/reconfigurations and
bootstrapping may happen. A security arrangement ought to additionally
consider the bootstrapping of the security parameters.
• Scalability : Adding nodes incrementally to a current network is a regular process.
Moreover, particularly in an IoT environment, a node ought to have the capacity
to make a protected E2E association with a variable number of companions. Also,
it ought to be conceivable to subjectively include and uproot secure associations
during its execution.
• Trust Level : The current trust level in a system is fluctuated and extremely
application subordinate. Case in point, in many organizations a GW exists that
interfaces multiple domains, the Internet and the constrained networks. GWs
are commonly not battery-controlled and are somewhat mains-fueled and all the
more capable as opposed to constrained entities .
Moreover, due to the heterogeneity of organizations, all the more capable entities
may be existing in the same network. Such intense nodes and GWs are contender to
deal with costly operations in the interest of constrained devices and dis-burden their
restricted assets. Then again, with regards to designating cryptographic operations
to all the more effective nodes, a certain level of trust is needed. Such a solid level
of trust may be available in a Body Area Network (BAN), where the individual cell
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phone serves as the GW for the body sensors. Too in an undertaking organization, the
GW could appreciate a solid trust level. Then again, there are too other application
situations where the GW can just in part be trusted. Case in point, in the city
automation, constrained devices of diverse assembling/administration suppliers utilize
the administrations of a GW which may be from an alternate administration supplier
and consequently, the GW can’t be trusted with touchy information. Consequently,
the expected trust level in a network is also an imperative variable for planning suitable
security arrangements. Case in point, selecting an off-way entity for assigning crypto
operations has the favorable position that the entity does not have understood access
to the delicate information activity.
3.4 Problem Statement
The authentication is generally established using DTLS handshaking protocol. If there
should arise an occurrence of authentication using mutual certficate sharing, DTLS
actuates overheads in manifestation of memory portion and communication. The vast
handshake messages bring the communication overhead. For processing these large
messages sufficient buffers are required. Again more overhead occurs to check and
approve the authentication of the certificates. The previously stated contemplations
need a definite examination of the overheads, which we handle in our work. This
permits us to have the capacity to devise ways to deal with lessen these overheads.
Secure IoT needs to achieve the goals of security that is confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity to provide secure M2M communication between entities and Internet.
Current methods use pre-shared keys on both ends and certficate-based schemes which
are infeasible for constrained entities. We argue that PKI included with IP-based
authentication can be deployed.
In this scenario, we concentrate on DTLS as the mean to attain secure
communication. To measure the resource requirements and overhead, we need to
implement a secure IoT network. This ought to be as lightweight as could be expected
under the circumstances, to fit the accessible resources of constrained entities. While
growing such an execution, overheads already existing can be recognized and answers
for lessen them contrived. Delegation approach is used to perform the expensive
PKC operations. This would permit using the advantages of PKC, for example, key
agreement without earlier learning, with an extensive variety of devices. All the more
critically, certificate-based authentication of the server can be done which is generally
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performed for web services. In any case, the overwhelming PKC operations could be
appointed to an all the more intense off-way device that satisfies the trust level.
At the same time we integrate capability-based security approach [24] to manage
access control in IoT. A capability is an access token that is used for authentication
and access control. It refers to a value that uniquely identifies an entity with the set
of access rights approved to that entity. Capability-based authorization has certain
advantages like: it helps in delegation, it supports granularity in access control and
helps in revoking authorization. These advantages make this approach important for a
fine-grain based access control environment.
3.5 Proposed Framework
The DTLS handshaking is delegated to a powerful server called Authentication,
Authorization and key distribution server (AAKDS) as shown in Figure 3.2.
Authentication,
Authorization
and Key
Distribution
Server
(AAKDS)
E1
E2
En
Internet
(curved line) communication
(straight line) authentication
Figure 3.2: Proposed Framework.
The model consists of 4 events: Entity Registration, Remote Server Registration,
Authentication of entities, communication.
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3.5.1 Registration of Entities
An entity comes with a predefined key and a predefined protocol suite. The entity
must be registered in the home network before the actual communication takes place.
The steps followed for registration is shown in Figure 3.3.
E
n
t
i
t
y
A
A
K
D
S
AAKDS-public-key, AAKDS-cipher-suite
[Entity-ID, Entity-Specific-Key,
Entity-Cipher-Suite]AAKDS-Public-Key
[Entity-Private-Key, Cipher-Suite]Entity-
Specific-Key
Figure 3.3: Entity Registration Process.
Procedure 1 : Entity Registration.
1: The AAKDS publishes its public key.
2: The Entity sends its credentials (Entity-specific-key and its Entity-specific-ID) and
its cipher suit to AAKDS, encrypted with the AAKDS-public-key.
3: AAKDS stores the credentials of the Entity in an encrypted form and sends a
private-key to the entity encrypted with the Entity-specific-key.
3.5.2 Registration of Remote Server
The Remote Server is registered using the DTLS handshaking as shown in Figure 3.4.
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A
A
K
D
S
HELLO
[Remote-Private-Key]Remote-Specific-Key
HELLO VERIFIED
REQUEST FOR CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
REQUEST FOR CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
CIPHER-SUITE AND KEY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Figure 3.4: Remote Server Registration Process.
Procedure 2 : Remote Server Registration.
1: The Remote Server sends a HELLO message to the AAKDS.
2: The AAKDS sends HELLO VERIFIED message.
3: The Remote Server requests for the cipher-suite and key of the AAKDS.
4: AAKDS sends it’s cipher-suite and key and waits for the acknowledgment.
5: AAKDS requests the Remote Server for it’s cipher-suite and keys.
6: The Remote Server sends it’s cipher-suite and key and waits for the
acknowledgment.
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3.5.3 Authentication and Authorization of Entities
A
A
K
D
S
[Request-Token]AAKDS-Public-Key
[[Access-Token]Entity-Specific-Key,Cipher-
Suite, Entity-Public-Key]Remote-Specific-Key
A
A
K
D
S
E
n
t
i
t
y
[Remote-ID, Token-ID, Remote-Public-
Key]Entity-Specific-Key
Figure 3.5: Authentication Process.
The authentication and authorization of entities use the following steps shown in
Figure 3.5:
(a) Access Token. (b) Request Token.
Figure 3.6: Tokens used for Authentication.
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Procedure 3 : Authentication and Authorization.
1: The Remote Server sends a request token, as shown in Figure 3.6, to the AAKDS
to access an entity.
2: AAKDS checks the authenticity of the Remote Server and finalize its Authorization.
3: AAKDS then issues an access token, as shown in Figure 3.6, to the Remote Server
encrypted with the Entity-specific-key. The access token represents the capability
token. It also sends the Entity-public-key.
4: The Remote-ID and the Token-ID is sent to the entity encrypted with the
Entity-specific-key.
5: The Entity stores the Remote-ID and the Token-ID for future verification.
3.5.4 Communication
The communication process is shown in Figure 3.7.
A
A
K
D
S
[Message]Remote-Public-Key
[[Access-Token]Entity-Specific-Key,Operation,
Remote-ID,message-ID]Entity-Public-Key
E
n
t
i
t
y
Figure 3.7: Communication Process.
Procedure 4 : Communication.
1: The Remote Server sends a message containing access token,Remote-ID, operation
to perform, and a message-ID encrypted with the Entity-public-key.
2: The entity decrypts it and verifies the access token.
3: The entity sends the required response after verifying the authorization.
4: If the Remote Server is not authenticated, then the operation request is rejected.
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Two entities also communicate using the same procedure.
3.6 Security Mechanisms
The proposed model takes care of the different security mechanisms to provide the
security services: Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Authentication, Nonrepudiation
and Access Control.
• Encipherment: Two techniques are generally used for enciphering: cryptography
and steganography. We use cryptography for encipherment which helps to achieve
confidentiality.
• Data Integrity: The integrity of data is also achieved using cryptography
techniques.
• Digital Signature: Since public key cryptography is used in our framework, digital
signature scheme can be added.
• Authentication Exchange: Two entities exchange their identities with the
AAKDS, and they use the keys and access token provided by the AAKDS to
verify each other.
• Traffic Padding: Some bogus data can be added during communication to thwart
the traffic analysis.
• Notarization: since AAKDS is involved in authentication exchange, one entity
can not deny the request or response.
• Access Control: A special capability-based Access Token is used which confirms
access control.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Results
This chapter provides the details of the implementation of our framework. The
cryptographic algorithms are implemented using AVRcryptolib library [25]. The
framework is tested using COOJA simulator [6] provided by Contiki OS. The results
show the time taken for different flights for each event.
4.1 COOJA
COOJA Simulator is a network simulator provides a Wireless Sensor Network
environment for IoT. It is provided by Contiki, which, unlike most simulators also
supports real hardware platforms to be emulated. It controls and analyzes a Contiki
system via a few functions. The sensors that run Contiki OS can be simulated using
Cooja , which is written in java. It simulates networks of sensor nodes of different
mote types where each node can be of a different type; differing not only in on-board
software, but also in the simulated hardware.
COOJA is flexible in that many parts of the simulator can be easily replaced or
extended with additional functionality. Example parts that can be extended, include
the simulated radio medium, simulated node hardware, and plug-ins for simulated
input/output. A simulated node in COOJA has three basic properties: its data
memory, the node type, and its hardware peripherals. The data memory is of very
small size analogous to the low -power devices used in IoT. Several nodes share the
node type and the properties common to all these nodes are determined. For example,
similar type nodes execute a common program code on the common simulated hardware
peripherals. And similar type nodes are initialized with the common data memory.
However, during execution, nodes’ data memories will eventually differ depending upon
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the different external inputs. The hardware peripherals include pins and ports for power
supply, communication and I/O purpose.
4.2 MSP430 Mote-type
The MSP430 mote-type denotes a 16-bit micro-controller from Texas Instrument (TI).
This is designed for low cost and low energy consuming embedded applications, as it
is the case in IoT. The basic MSP430 MCUs have an address space of 64 KBytes and
can only address memory, including program code, data and peripherals, within this
range.
The Z1 mote which is used in simulation has the following properties.
— has a second generation MSP430F2617 low power microcontroller,
— has a CC2420 transceiver, which operates at 2.4GHz with an effective data
rate of 250Kbps,
— has abuilt-in digital sensors ready to work,
— has a digital programmable accelerometer (ADXL345),
— has a digital temperature sensor (TMP102),
— does not require additional HW to program,
— provides maximum efficiency and robustness with low energy cost.
4.3 Performance Analysis
The performance is analyzed taking the following considerations: Entities use
Symmetric-Key cryptography to communicate with the AAKDS. For the inter-entity
communication Asymmetric-Key cryptography is used. The Request-Token and The
Access-Token are shown in Figure 4.1.
The following 4 sets of algorithms are used for the implementation of different events
and the comparisons are shown below.
• RSA [26] & AES-128 [27]
• RSA [26] & PRESENT-128 [28]
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• ECC [29] & AES-128 [27]
• ECC [29] & PRESENT-128 [28]
(a) The Access-Token (b) The Request-Token
Figure 4.1: Token Specifications.
The field values used for our tests are:
Token-ID - unique random number
Requesting-Entity-ID - IPV6 address
Resource-Entity-ID - IPV6 address
Assigner-ID - IPV6 address
Assignee-ID - IPV6 address
Rights - characters
since - characters(dd-mm-yyyy form)
till - characters(dd-mm-yyyy form)
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4.3.1 Registration of Entities
Registration of entities event is discussed in the section 3.5.1. The specifications used
for entity registration in our test bed is shown in Figure 4.2.
(a) Flight1 from AAKDS to Entity (b) Flight2 from Entity to AAKDS
(c) Flight3 from AAKDS to Entity
Figure 4.2: Flights used for Entity Registration Event.
The comparison of time unit taken for entity registration using different
cryptographic algorithm sets are shown in the table 4.1
Table 4.1: Comparison of different algorithm sets for Entity Registration.
RSA	&	AES
RSA	&	PRESENT
ECC	&	AES
ECC	&	PRESENT
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
12:48.220
12:10.977
10:43.285
10:15.472
12:50.708
12:13.465
10:45.773
10:17.960
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Figure 4.3: Entity Registration Plot.
4.3.2 Authentication Checking
(a) Flight1:request from Entity to AAKDS (b) Flight2:respond from AAKDS to Entity
(c) Flight3 from AAKDS to resource Entity
Figure 4.4: Flights used for Authentication Event.
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Authorization and Authentication event is discussed in the section 3.5.3. The
specifications used for entity registration in our test bed is shown in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.2: Comparison of different algorithm sets for Authentication Process.
RSA	&	AES
RSA	&	PRESENT
ECC	&	AES
ECC	&	PRESENT
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
11:10.376
10:34.048
09:28.316
09:09.962
11:12.864
10:36.536
09:30.804
09:12.450
The comparison of time unit taken for authentication process, using different
cryptographic algorithm sets, are shown in the table 4.2.
Figure 4.5: Entity Authentication Plot.
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4.3.3 Communication
Communication between the entities event is discussed in the section 3.5.4. The
specifications used in our test bed for this event is shown in Figure 4.6.
(a) Flight1:request from Entity to AAKDS (b) Flight2:respond from AAKDS to Entity
Figure 4.6: Flights sent to access a service.
The comparison of time unit taken for requesting a service and getting the respond
using different cryptographic algorithm sets are shown in the table 4.3
Table 4.3: Comparison of different algorithm-sets for Communication Event.
RSA	&	AES
RSA	&	PRESENT
ECC	&	AES
ECC	&	PRESENT
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
00:02.488
11:48.583
11:16.604
09:58.294
09:34.296
11:51.071
11:19.092
10:00.782
09:36.784
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Figure 4.7: Communication Plot.
4.4 Chapter Summary
From the above tables and graphs it is identified that the connection time is almost
negligible as compared to the computation time and communication time. The
implementation of PRESENT algorithm for the encryption and decryption of the
message between the Entity and the AAKDS, and , ECC algorithm for the encryption
and decryption of the message used for inter-Entity communication, takes less time
for each event. Finally it is realizable that, the capability based authentication and
access control can be implemented in constrained network and it gives satisfactory
performance.
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Hardware Emulation
This chapter provides the details of the hardware implementation of our framework. We
prepare a testbed where Arduino Uno micro-controller is used as the entity to provide
the services. In the Arduino board the cryptographic algorithms are implemented using
arduino IDE 1.6.3 [30] and AVRcryptolib library [25]. We analyze the memory space
taken to implement the cryptographic algorithms..
5.1 Hardware Requirement
For our hardware implementation we use the following devices:
• 2 Arduino uno R3 micro-controller boards,
• 2 ESP8266 wifi modules,
• 2 bread-boards,
• 1 LED,
• jumper-wires.
The Arduino Uno R3 microcontroller board and it’s specifications are shown in
Figure 5.1
The ESP8266 wifi module with it’s pin specification and it’s connection specification
with Arduino uno R3 is shown in Figure 5.2
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(a) arduino uno R3
Micro-controller															:					ATmega328
Flash	Memory																				:					32Kb
SRAM																																				:					2048b
operating	voltage														:					5v
Input	voltage																						:					7-12v
Digital	I/O	pins																		:					14(6PWM	output)
Analog	input	pins														:						6
DC	current	per	I/O	pin				:					40mA
DC	current	per	3.3v	pin			:					50mA
clock	speed																										:						16	mHz
(b) arduino uno R3 specfications
Figure 5.1: Arduino Uno R3 micro-controller Board.
(a) ESP8266 wifi module
Instruction	RAM									:								64Kb
Data	RAM																						:							96Kb
ROM																																:							64	Kb
operating	voltage								:							3.3v
Input	voltage																	:						7-12v
Analog	input	pins									:								8
clock	speed																					:						80	mHz
(b) ESP8266 specfications
Figure 5.2: ESP8226 micro-controller Board.
5.2 Emulation and Result Analysis
We create a testbed as below. The connection specifications are shown in Figure 5.3.
UNO
330ohms-1.5Kohms
digital pins
GND
(a) arduino uno R3 and LED
Arduino	pins															ESP8266	pins
									Tx										<----------->						Rx
									Rx										<----------->						Tx
								3.3v								<----------->					Vcc
								GND							<----------->					GND
								3.3v								<----------->			CH_POD													
(b) arduino uno R3 and ESP8266
Figure 5.3: Connection Specifications.
32
5.2 Emulation and Result Analysis Hardware Emulation
Search the 
Network
start
Network 
found?
NETWORK FOUND
Establish the 
Connection
CONNECTED
Send
Request
REQUEST SENT
Wait for 
response
RESPONSE SENT
Search the 
Network
start
Network 
found?
NETWORK FOUND
Establish the 
Connection
CONNECTED
Receive 
Request
REQUEST RECEIVED
Check 
Authentication
AUTHENTICATION DETERMINED
Send Response
RESPONSE RECEIVED
yes
STOP
yes
nono
STOPSTOP
Figure 5.4: State Transition Diagram for the Requesting Entity (left) and the Resource
Entity(right).
• First arduino microcontroller is connected with an LED. It provides wifi service
using ESP8266 wifi module and serves as the resource entity. It provides 3
services: 1) only Read i.e., the requesting entity can only query whether the LED
is ON or OFF, 2) Both Read and Write i.e., the requesting entity can inquire the
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status of the LED and also toggle it, 3) The requesting entity can not access the
status.
• The second arduino microcontroller is also connected to ESP8266 wifi module to
communicate with the first one. It serves as the requesting entity.
• The key values and the cipher-suites are already set.
The state transition diagram for the requesting entity and resource entity are shown
in Figure 5.4.
The RAM size used by implementing the different cryptographic algorithm sets
mentioned in section 4.3 are shown in the table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Comparison of RAM capacity used.
RSA	&	AES
RSA	&	PRESENT
ECC	&	AES
ECC	&	PRESENT
100 	
	
	
	
5.3 Chapter Summary
From the hardware implementation of our framework and quick analysis of the RAM
capacity used by different algorithm sets given in the table 5.1, we find that ECC
and PRESENT combination requires more RAM capacity. But we still suggest this
for better performance, since ECC gives same security as RSA with smaller key size
according to NIST recommendation of key size [31].
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Conclusions and Future Work
To summarize, the work gives a framework that can be used by organizations to
protect and manage their information in the environment of IOT. As part of the
work the different light weight cryptographic algorithms are tested in the proposed
framework. Under the test environment, the developed prototype has delivered
promising performance results. Hence the proposed framework might be considered
for use in real world scenarios.
6.1 Suggestions for Improvement
The following key points are suggested as the extension of our work
• Our evaluation focuses on the constrained networks. However, in the IOT we
need to consider the interaction of the constrained devices with the traditional
Internet i.e., a Remote Sever may be given the access control as proposed in our
framework. COOJA is not suitable for this simulation. Still it can be tested by
developing a web-server application which perform the task of Remote Server. A
cryptography library JScrypto, written in Jscript can be used for cryptographic
implementations.
• Our work may not meet the requirements for each and every use case of the vast
IOT domain, like in the transmission of real time data stream.
• In a IOT domain an entity can work both as a client and a server. So, a novel
alternate authentication approach is needed for an entity to be able to delegate
authentication to another entity.
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• For performance benefits, newer cryptographic algorithms can be explored.
• When entities communicate directly a port has to be opened in the router, which
creates a play field for the hackers. Hence an alternate model can be explored
where a cloud sever can be used as an intermediary.
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